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The earliest evidence of distinctive human efforts at representation are the engraved lines 
and cross-hatchings on the surfaces of two small oblongs of ochre, two and three inches 
long, retrieved from the Middle Stone Age layers of Blombos Cave on the southern coast 
of South Africa in 1999 and 2000. They are approximately 70 000 years old, more than 
35 000 years older than any other Stone Age ‘art’. Whatever their precise purpose may 
have been, these intentional, abstract markings indicate the presence of modern human 
behavior, a most marvelous find.1 Juxtapose this piece of information with the title of 
Harold Bloom’s 1998 blockbuster, Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human, 2 and you 
face a dark question, indeed, an abyss of perplexity. What does Harold Bloom’s title 
mean?  
 
This essay was occasioned by the casual reading of a book called Harold Bloom’s 
Shakespeare (2002),3 a collection of responses, pro, ante and puzzled, to Bloom’s 
Shakespearean magnum opus. The more I browsed in the assembled essays, some of 
them originally reviews and conference papers, others specially commissioned responses, 
the more curious I became. On the whole, the contributors seemed not to understand 
Bloom, at least not to understand him adequately, which is a devastating handicap when 
the task in hand is to pass judgment. The problem seems to be that few academic 
commentators take Bloom seriously, accepting that he means what he says; more 
accurately, they find it hard to entertain with full seriousness matters Bloom intends 
should be taken entirely seriously. Shakespeareans, locked into their various ways of 
understanding the world and critical activity, generally try to find Shakespeare (or 
“Shakespeare”) through reading Bloom, whereas he wants us to find ourselves through 
reading Shakespeare: to uncover what Emerson called ‘the Shakespeare in us’.4 The 
difference is stupendous. We ought first to ask in regard to Bloom’s blockbuster the 
question Bloom tells us he learned from Kenneth Burke, ‘What is the author trying to do 
for himself or herself by writing this work?’.5 
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We could do worse than start from the most astute short interpretation of Bloom’s 
position to appear to date. There may be some temerity in furthering the arguments of one 
of the most distinguished Shakespearean commentators of the twentieth century, whose 
sad loss remains so palpable, but A.D Nuttall would be the first to insist that the academic 
conversation should continue. Rightly distinguishing between Bloom ‘the Genial Old 
Buffer of Letters’ and Bloom ‘the Gnostic prophet’, Nuttall discerns two theses implicit 
in Bloom’s subtitle, ‘The Invention of the Human’. His words need citing at length: 
 
The first thesis is that Shakespeare more than any other writer knew the human 
heart and mind. His plots may be fictitious but the plays deal with human 
possibilities and probabilities at a profound level, and so attain universality. Those 
new historicists who would confine Shakespeare within the narrow semantic 
determination of three decades are mistaken. Shakespeare conveys to us the 
before unapprehended richness of our own humanity. [This, it might be added, is 
also the gist of Nuttall’s own superb book, A New Mimesis (1983).] The second 
thesis is that Shakespeare, in a quasi-divine manner, created – made up – “the 
human,” as we now understand it. - - - Perhaps, it might be said, Bloom means 
that the work of art comes first and is afterwards imitated by nature: Shakespeare 
dreamed up a model of the human, and attained a position of cultural dominance, 
with the result that the model became real insofar as real human beings actually 
began to behave in ways suggested by the original fiction. 
         
The notion that Shakespeare ‘made up’ the human, Nuttall rightly decries as a ‘hollow 
conception’, its thrust rendered more objectionable for playing to the sociological 
impulse of those he politely calls ‘the trendies’ (probably a gentler term for Bloom’s 
catch-all “school of resentment”), thereby conveniently implicating Shakespeare in 
humanity’s subsequent history of political and moral turpitude not only as an attendant 
muse, but as its very instigator. This would be a shallowly subversive reading of Bloom’s 
sub-title, embracing that sales-worthy shock-value so dear to book publicists, and 
inadvertently supplying grist to the mill of the various formalists and post-structuralists 
whom Nuttall treats with such sophistication and devastating forensic intelligence in A 
New Mimesis. However, Nuttall then finds the two theses he has identified not quite 
separable after all: 
- - - Bloom immediately after quoting Wittgenstein points out that the philosopher 
is “evading the truth that Shakespeare makes us see and think what we could not 
have seen or thought without him.” “See” and “seen” in this sentence at once 
imply the pre-existent character of the truths conveyed by Shakespeare, that they 
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were not created but were apprehended (probed, analyzed) by him – and this is 
the first thesis, back in place! 6  
        
Relations between these two theses, their distinctness, sundering and ultimate 
togetherness, rather like the metaphysical ties between the fat knight and Prince Hal in 
Bloom’s personalized Shakespearean pantheon, go to the heart of his idiosyncratic but 
deeply challenging response to the world of letters. More importantly, it is the 
metaphysic informing the second thesis, partially concealed in Nuttall’s account and 
masked by the surface shock of the book’s subtitle, that informs Bloom’s 
literary/philosophical project, even though he might well deny that he has one, if put in 
those terms. 
 
* * * 
 
Bloom Brontosaurus Bardolator (to cite his full nom-de-guerre) has given up on 
academia, as of late he tells us so forcefully and repetitively – in fact, he resigned in 
protest from the Yale English department as early as 1967 – and it seems from the 
professional response to his ‘big’ books, The Western Canon (1994),7 Shakespeare: The 
Invention of the Human (1998), and Genius (2002),8 that indeed academia at large isn’t 
sure any longer what to make of him. The university world is in awe of his popular 
publishing success. Ordinary people actually pay attention to Bloom and buy his books; 
but why is he caught up in a strange version of outmoded ‘character criticism’? Why does 
he offer summative assessment and contrastive judgment, rather than make the attempt to 
explicate the formative, dialectical process of meaning-making through detailed 
sequential interpretation? Why does he pronounce, rather than probe and explore, in a 
style reminiscent of the Johnsonian ‘big bow-wow’? Why is he so bitterly scornful of 
what he calls ‘the school of resentment’? Why doesn’t he acknowledge his sources 
properly? I shall touch on many of these questions in what follows, but underlying them 
all is Bloom’s insistence on the tension between Shakespeare’s radical exceptionality and 
sociological generalization of all kinds. 
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Bloom’s position on Shakespeare’s distinctiveness seems to me, if not unassailable, at 
least completely intelligible, once one understands it; not because of anything intrinsic to 
Shakespeare and his texts, but exactly because what applies to Shakespeare applies to all 
authors and artists. As Bloom expresses it (in Where Shall Wisdom be Found?): 
Nothing explains Shakespeare, or can explain him away. Historicizing him, old- 
or new-style, expires rapidly, since the same cultural factors are equally apt and 
inapt for his contemporaries, a large company of rival poet-dramatists. Nor are the 
various totalizing approaches – Marxist, Freudian, feminist, what you will – other 
than reductive. Those who fall back on language are left with language, and even 
Wittgenstein contributed nothing but evasion by naming Shakespeare “a creator 
of language.” And yet Lewis Carroll, James Joyce and others, or Ben Jonson and 
Edmund Spenser in Shakespeare’s age, also were creators of language.9  
          
Thus Bloom forthrightly impugns the adequacy of sociological explanation and rebuts the 
so-called ‘linguistic turn’. He writes in How to Read and Why? (2000), ‘If you wish to 
maintain that Shakespeare’s ascendancy was a product of colonialism, then who will 
bother to confute you?’.10 This is more than saying Yes, of course Shakespeare is subject 
to sociological and historical process, like everyone and everything else. What Bloom 
means is that ‘Of course this is so, and it really doesn’t matter’; or it really doesn’t matter 
in relation to what does matter. The efforts of historical and textual scholarship are to be 
taken for granted, debated, and accepted or rejected as ancillary contributions, not 
substituted for the primal power of the fully imagined work, the apprehension of which 
may indeed be informed and enriched by such labours. He challenges the disciplines of 
historical interpretation, retreating from historicisms of all kinds, principally on the 
authority and example of Emerson.  
 
Indeed Emerson, that weird and amazing writer, is the heart and soul of Bloom’s project, 
his essential progenitor – something Nuttall underplays. We must acknowledge that a 
notable feature of late Bloom is the manner in which his earlier work – and reading – is 
boldly absorbed into his popular blockbusters, not only in undocumented quotations, but 
in silent assimilations and sketchy gestures. His ‘gurus’, Johnson (‘invention’), Hazlitt 
(‘gusto’), Pater (the aesthetic as ‘insight’ or ‘perceptiveness’) are foregrounded; but so 
are Blake and Shelley, Wordsworth and Coleridge, Yeats and Joyce – and that is even 
before we broach his idiosyncratic preoccupation with the pre-Socratics, Orphism and 
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Kabbalah, and then the rich sweep of world literature of which he approves. This kind of 
performance is more than the stylistic quirk of a senior intellect, garrulous and erudite, 
aiming for an impossible comprehensiveness, compelled to generate a measureless flow 
of treasured insights before the curtain falls – though that would be one trivial way of 
understanding his enterprise. Of course there are moments when the rhetoric stales, the 
hyperbole irritates, the authoritative pronunciamentos pall. But to leave it at this is to 
evade the challenge of Bloom, to misunderstand the seductive vision which animates 
him; and the fount of that vision is Emerson. 
  
If one’s sense of New England Transcendentalism is of a somewhat tepid prelude to the 
major American authors, complacent Concord squabbling with Unitarian Boston about 
rival theologies – an approach usefully embalmed in Santayana’s essay ‘The Genteel 
Tradition in American Philosophy’ (1911)11 – then it will always be difficult to hear what 
Bloom is saying. This decadent version of Emerson should be supplanted by the 
dangerous thinker celebrated by Nietzsche (in his ‘Twilight of the Idols’, 1888),12 by 
Bloom and, indeed, by Stanley Cavell, who warns: “Emerson’s writing will, from the 
outside, seem vague and inflated, but from inside will acquire a terrible exactness”.13 
Bloom himself invokes the terse verdict of Angelo Giametti: “Emerson is as sweet as 
barbed wire!”.14 
 
We must come to terms with those three primordial blasts against formalism, Nature 
(1836),15 the foundation of everything Emerson was to write in the future; ‘The American 
Scholar’ (1837)16 and ‘The Divinity School Address’ (‘An Address’,1838).17 In Nature, it 
is our endlessly purblind, stifling subservience to tradition and inherited social 
institutions that comes under scrutiny; in ‘The American Scholar’, slavish submission to 
the mechanisms of scholarship and bookish authority; in ‘The Divinity School Address’ 
meek acquiescence in the established rites of received religions and philosophies, 
ecclesiasticisms of all kinds. Listen again to the opening words of Nature: 
Our age is retrospective. It builds the sepulchres of the fathers. It writes 
biographies, histories, and criticism. The foregoing generations beheld God and 
Nature face-to-face; we through their eyes. Why should not we also enjoy an 
original relation to the universe? 18        
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That founding question of Nature, ‘Why should not we also enjoy an original relation to 
the universe?’ underlies Bloom’s approach to Shakespeare, to literature and to what he 
calls “deep reading”. Indeed, Eduardo Cadava remarks that ‘the questions of Emerson’s 
first book are how reading and writing happen and why they make such a difference in 
and to history’.19 At the heart of the matter is the question of originality, and we could do 
worse than ponder Emerson’s summative statement in his essay ‘Quotation and 
Originality’ (1859): 
Our debt to tradition through reading and conversation is so massive, our protest 
or private addition to tradition so rare and insignificant, – and this commonly on 
the ground of other reading and hearing, – that, in a large sense, one would say 
there is no pure originality.20        
 
At times Emerson seems almost overwhelmed by the extent to which our intellects are 
mere palimpsests of inherited thought; and beyond this anxiety lies an even more 
disturbing possibility, namely, that we ourselves seem much more like biological and 
social quotations than original utterances: 
 
The old animals have given their bodies to the earth to furnish through chemistry 
the forming race, and every individual is only a momentary fixation of what was 
yesterday another’s, is today his and will belong to a third to-morrow. So it is in 
thought. Our knowledge is the amassed thought and experience of innumerable 
minds: our language, our science, our religion, our opinions, our fancies we 
inherited. Our country, our customs, laws, our ambitions, and our notions of fit 
and fair, – all these we never made, we found them ready-made; but we quote 
them.21         
The sense here recall’s Marx’s memorable words in The Eighteenth Brumaire: ‘The 
tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living’.22 
Against this all-embracing, suffocating domination by our social and biological past, 
Emerson has nothing to pit but the transcendental self, or what he calls ‘the indefeasible 
persistency of the individual to be himself’: 
 
To all that can be said of the preponderance of the Past, the single word Genius is 
a sufficient reply. The divine resides in the new. The divine never quotes, but is, 
and creates.23        
 
Standing inside Emerson’s words here are Wordsworth and Coleridge and Carlyle; and 
behind them what this trio had variously made of the Kantian revolution. We hear Carlyle 
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intoning in ‘Signs of the Times’ (1829) that ‘The poorest Day that passes over us is the 
conflux of two Eternities; it is made up of currents that issue from the remotest Past, and 
flow onwards into the remotest Future’.24 Emerson counters with: ‘The profound 
apprehension of the Present is Genius, which makes the past forgotten’.25 The human 
predicament evoked here calls to mind Duke Vincentio’s heartless musings to Claudio in 
his ‘Be absolute for death’ speech in Measure for Measure: ‘Thou hast nor youth nor 
age,/But as it were an after-dinner’s sleep/Dreaming on both’ (3.1.32-34); and then 
Johnson’s felicitous take on it, much admired by Bloom: 
This is exquisitely imagined. When we are young we busy ourselves in forming 
schemes for succeeding time, and miss the gratifications that are before us; when 
we are old we amuse the languor of age with the recollection of youthful 
pleasures or performances; so that our life, of which no part is filled with the 
business of the present time, resembles our dreams after dinner, when the events 
of the morning are mingled with the designs of the evening.26   
         
The youthful Emerson, for whom an empirically elusive present is all-in-all, launches 
open rebellion against humanity’s perpetual ‘after dinner’s sleep’, composed of tradition, 
history and ‘facts’, those complex fictions which smother the living present. It is the very 
deadness of past and future, their ontological absence, which makes the fresh and 
momentary freedom of ‘Now’, the flow of words from the pen’s tip on to the page, in the 
case of a writer, the only possible escape. ‘Genius believes its faintest presentiment 
against the testimony of all history; for it knows that facts are not ultimates, but that a 
state of mind is the ancestor of everything. And what is originality? It is being, being 
one’s self, and reporting accurately what we see and are’.27 The enemy to be fought is the 
obliteration of the real or transcendental self by the grindings and sublimations of habit 
and custom, unthinking submission to that ordinary frame of reference wherein Hume, 
for example, found relief from the implications of his own scepticism. Emerson set 
himself to challenge that ordinary frame of reference by championing his deeply 
democratic belief that we too can enjoy ‘an original relation with the universe’ through 
paying attention to an inner locus of discovery, the transcendental self. 
 
What is the transcendental self? Kant had shown that our apprehension of causality, space 
and time was exactly that, an apprehension, conditioned by our own human perceptual 
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and mental apparatus. Reality, as it really is, is beyond our apprehension. We know only 
in accordance with our human senses and sensibilities. But sometimes it seems we are 
granted privileged moments, Wordsworthian ‘spots of time’, or what Emerson in the 
‘Divinity School Address’ called those ‘few real hours of life’ in which we all have 
‘sublime thoughts’.28 The Emersonian archetype of such moments, a passage worked up 
his journals, stands as the experiential guarantee of his argument in Nature, and by 
implication all his subsequent writing: 
Crossing a bare common, in snow puddles, at twilight, under a clouded sky, 
without having in my thoughts any occurrence of special good fortune, I have 
enjoyed a perfect exhilaration - - - - I feel that nothing can befall me in life, – no 
disgrace, no calamity, (leaving me my eyes,) which nature cannot repair. Standing 
on the bare ground, – my head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted into infinite 
space, – all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eye-ball; I am nothing; 
I see all; the currents of the universal Being circulate through me; I am part or 
particle of God.29       
That weird image of the ‘transparent eyeball’, satirized in a famous caricature by 
Christopher Cranch,30 is Emerson’s (failed) attempt to conceptualise the transcendental 
self, to sustain the trope of knowing as seeing beyond any naturalistic limit.  A residual 
attachment to his empirical self is signalled by that humble interpolation in parenthesis, 
‘(leaving me my eyes)’; elsewhere this empirical self, the site of ‘all mean egotism’, is 
utterly supplanted by a thrilling god-like awareness transcending the mundane 
deliverances of the senses. Contra the Cranch caricature, the bizarre transparent eyeball 
becomes one with the dome of the sky and the far-circling horizon, as a metaphor for un-
centred experience outside the limitations of space and time, beyond the empirical self. 
Here is a momentary ‘reading’ of nature seemingly independent of received tradition (but 
what about Wordsworth and Coleridge and Carlyle we must insidiously ask?), which 
marks the experience of ‘Being’, and the locus of originality, inspiration, creativity – all 
those good things to which the romantics accord ontological validity and conceptual 
space. 
 
We don’t much like philosophy that seems to postulate unnecessary and un-get-at-able 
entities such as transcendental selves, so it may be worth foregrounding the disconcerting 
fact that no-one, not even Susan Greenfield, has ever seen a brain as in itself it really is. 
What Greenfield (author of The Human Brain: A Guided Tour, 1997)31 has seen is what 
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her senses and instrumentation present to her brain, another entity which she will never 
see as it is in itself. It is not a physical entity at all that Emerson is describing, but the 
vivid experience of our mental and spiritual aliveness which cannot be captured 
empirically. This is perhaps the moment to quote what Bloom calls ‘the most subversive 
of all Emersonian sentences’. Caught in its own syntactic rigor and concision, it is this: 
‘Speak rather of that which relies, because it works and is’.32 If that seems a little gnomic, 
here is a more expansive version: 
To believe your own thought [says Emerson], to believe that what is true for you 
in your private heart, is true for all men, – that is genius - - - - A man should learn 
to detect and watch that gleam of light which flashes across his mind from within, 
more than the luster of the firmament of bards and sages. Yet he dismisses 
without notice his own thought, because it is his. In every work of genius we 
recognize our own rejected thoughts: they come back to us with a certain 
alienated majesty.33     
 
Bloom tells us that ‘We read, frequently if unknowingly, in search of a mind more 
original than our own’.34 We read Shakespeare in order to uncover, or rediscover, what 
Emerson calls ‘the Shakespeare in us’;35 and we choose Shakespeare because in a 
particular sense there is more of us in Shakespeare than in any other writer. This does not 
simply mean the extended, reified range of characters, relationships and predicaments on 
view. We discover ourselves, or new aspects of our ‘selves’, through following and 
absorbing the motile impress of Shakespeare’s mind at work in his poetry and plays, his 
active exploration of his age and culture and its possible significances. This is what 
Bloom means by the colon in the title of his big book: Shakespeare, colon, The Invention 
of the Human. Were it not for Shakespeare we would know a great deal less about what 
kind of creatures we are or might become – so Bloom’s claim goes. 
 
Bloom’s massive public recursions through eclectic swathes of world literature, often 
treating the same writers again and again, not only in The Western Canon, Shakespeare, 
and Genius, but also in How to Read and Why (2000) and Where Shall Wisdom be 
Found? (2004) stem, it seems to me, less from an endless desire for summative 
recapitulation than from an urgent need to continually refresh the self by experiencing the 
intense frisson of discovery, of new insight. (We remind ourselves again of Kenneth 
Burke’s diagnostic question, ‘What is the author trying to do for himself or herself by 
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writing this work?’) The big books trace these fertile encounters, are in effect their 
residue, offering the reader the opportunity to ‘overhear’ the Bloomian daemon seeking 
its literary salvation, its next surprising emancipation from ‘the Beautiful Necessity’ 
grudgingly acknowledged by the later Emerson.36 This is indeed a very odd form of 
literary ‘character study’.  
 
When, therefore, scholars accuse Bloom of belated attempts to resuscitate an outmoded 
character criticism, they need to be sure he is in fact doing what they think he is doing. In 
a piece elaborated from his review in the New Statesman, Terence Hawkes takes casual 
notice of Bloom’s obeisance to A.C. Bradley, and then hares off on a vividly entertaining 
demolition of the kind of character criticism to which Bradley gave rise – he is 
particularly acerbic about its impact in schools – not noticing that Bloom’s obsession 
with character is only tangentially related to Bradley’s. Hawkes writes of Shakespeare: 
‘Bloom’s book is Bradley and water, with quite a bit of wind as well’.37 Linda Charnes 
observes (rhetorically) that ‘We can bash Bloom as much as we like for his revival of 
A.C. Bradley’s greatest triumphs in character criticism; but - - -’.38 Mustapha Fahmi 
asserts that the book is ‘written in the critical tradition of A.C. Bradley’.39 William 
Kerrigan fits Bloom into a tradition that ‘flowered in A.C. Bradley’s classic 
Shakespearean Tragedy’.40 Richard Levin is fairer to Bradley, noting that his lectures 
‘devote considerable attention to details of the plot, so that this is really character-and-
action criticism’,41 but he then goes on to describe Bloom’s book as ‘an all-out, 
hyperbolic celebration of [bardolatry and character criticism] that goes far beyond 
anything in the Bradleyan or New Critical traditions’.42 So Bloom out-Bradleys Bradley! 
Bradley-bashing has always seemed to me a ludicrous pastime and, had I the space, some 
of the anxieties underlying the reflex would be worth exploring. Instead I must content 
myself with showing that Bloom’s and Bradley’s projects are in fact theoretically 
separable, and that what each is doing remains valid – if as a critic that is what you 
choose to do. To be sure, Bloom repeatedly situates himself in a line of ‘Romantic 
criticism, from Hazlitt through Pater and A.C. Bradley on to Harold Goddard’.43 But is 
his project a mere quotation or even a routine historical extension of Bradley’s?  
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* * * 
 
We need to note some ordinary theoretical distinctions concerning character criticism. 
There is a conceptual difference between studying character (or specific characters) as 
part of the formal constitution of a play, exploring how a bevy of particular imagined 
persons, their appearances, their physical and verbal interactions and demeanor across 
textual time, can be shown to emerge from the language of a playscript, drenched in the 
verbal/cognitive tropes that inform that language and its amplified realization in stage 
performance; and the very different activity of forming a summative response to 
characters who have ‘come to life’ in the imagination with such vividness that they 
apparently transcend their contribution to the play, and seem to assume compelling 
autonomy in imagined situations and relations beyond their textual ‘home’, overflowing 
their original matrix. The latter discourse assumes a position internal to the imagined 
world, and for some years now such discussion has been derogated as not intellectually 
cogent, the sort of thing that ‘genial old buffers’ indulge in from the sidelines while the 
real issues are being fought over in the lists by professionals. This emphasis was largely a 
result of institutional pressure, what the economist Joseph Schumpeter might have 
dubbed “the herd-like movement” of critics.44 Partly as a side-effect of literary studies 
having to earn their credentials in an academic climate dominated by ‘scientism’, in the 
30s and 40s of the last century formalism of various kinds and intensities came to be 
accepted as the true (and almost the only) way of studying literature. The task was to 
explain the means whereby the work of art produced its effects. Sensitive exploration of 
the fully-realised work of art was almost taken for granted, accepted as shared ‘data’; 
what mattered was formal descriptive acuity and, increasingly, sociological explanation.  
Nuttall captured the essence of what was being newly emphasized as against what was 
being neglected or taken for granted, with his notion of the two languages of criticism: 
the opaque language of formalism and the transparent language of critical discourse 
which grounds itself in the probabilities and possibilities of the fully-realised imaginative 
world.45 More than simply a limit situation on a continuum between critical detachment 
and imaginative participation, or objective analysis and full subjective identification, the 
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latter type of critical work should be understood as a second order activity enacted upon 
the imaginative legacy of the first. 
 
Let me illustrate. The seminal broadside against Bradley (as is well known) came from 
L.C. Knights in his essay ‘How Many Children had Lady Macbeth’ (1933), 46 its 
provocative title borrowed from F.R. Leavis.47 The question of the Macbeth offspring, 
which Bradley himself addresses only incidentally, and with perfect propriety as far as I 
can see (in Shakespearean Tragedy, Note EE), 48 has come to represent a critical fallacy 
whereby literary characters are (mistakenly) treated as if they are or were real people. In 
his corrective, Knights urged that ‘the only profitable approach to Shakespeare is a 
consideration of his plays as dramatic poems, of his use of language to obtain a total 
complex emotional response’.49 The trouble with this view, valuable though it is in 
urging attention to the nature of poetic drama, is that any such ‘complex emotional [or 
intellectual – LW] response’ is impossible without imagining those dramatic characters 
as real people and responding accordingly. Dwell on, experience, the poetry as fully as 
we may, the characters that take life in the poetry must be fully realized and realizable for 
adequate emotional response to be possible. I stress the word ‘fully’: no matter how 
peripheral the character, the possibly sparse words and the informing predicament which 
call him or her into being must be sufficient for that minor character to be adequately and 
accurately realized as a person, an imagined being, and so to perform their particular job 
adequately in the poetic structure of the play. Knight’s famous piece stands for a lop-
sided modernist criticism prepared to revere Shakespeare as the author of a poetic drama 
exploring themes, leitmotivs and a ‘system of values’,50 while shying away from a 
Shakespeare who was also and eminently a great “creator of characters”.51  
 
Kenneth Burke’s robust critique of Bradleyan character criticism is similarly dogmatic. 
‘Shakespeare is making a play, not people’, 52 he writes; ‘The stress upon character as an 
intrinsic property, rather than as an illusion arising functionally from the context, leads 
towards a non-dramatic explanation.’ His argument reaches its climax as follows: 
Whereas it has become customary to speak of Shakespeare’s figures as of living 
people, the stupidest and crudest person who ever lived is richer in motivation 
than all of Shakespeare’s characters put together – and it would be either a 
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stupidity or a sacrilege to say otherwise. It is as an artist, not as God, that he 
invents “characters”.53     
It must be worth pointing out, somewhat mischievously, that Shakespeare himself set out 
to destroy Burke’s argument here in the statue scene of The Winter’s Tale – and 
succeeded magnificently! Were we to allow with Burke that characters subsist mainly as 
‘character functions’ within dramatic structures, and that therefore plays must always 
remain illusions, secondary imitations, conscious representations, this would be to urge 
for the sake of a skewed critical propriety and a mistaken devotion to formalism, that all 
plays must fail! Or else succeed only in formalist terms. Burke is prepared to concede, 
with Stanislavski in mind, that so-called ‘novelistic improvising’ may be useful for an 
actor preparing to take on a role,54 but such formative efforts to realize the drama, to 
assimilate its implications, become confused in his thinking with illegitimate efforts to re-
write it, dismissed as Paterian impressionism in a rather disabling fashion: 
The risk in “portraiture” of the Bradleyan sort (and Samuel Johnson has done it 
admirably too, also with reference to Othello) is that the critic ends where he 
should begin. As Jimmy Durante has so relevantly said, “Everyone wants to get 
into the act.” In this sense, impressionistic criticism would write the work over 
again. Let the critic be as impressionistic as he wants, if he but realize that his 
impressions are the beginning of his task as a critic, not the end of it. Indeed, the 
richer his impressions the better, if he goes on to show how the author produced 
them. But the great risk in “conclusive” statements about a work is that they give 
us the feeling of conclusions when the real work of analysis is still before us.55 
          
Burke is a formalist and rhetorician seeking to understand how art is made, how it works, 
as was L.C Knights in his New Critical way. So too was Bradley even though, famously, 
he was prepared to compare characters across plays (‘In Desdemona’s place, Cordelia, 
however frightened at Othello’s anger about the lost handkerchief, would not have denied 
its loss’)56 and to discuss their inner lives as though they were indeed real people. Bradley 
was willing to take his consideration of characters to the very limit of his imagined 
Shakespearean world, without shattering it. But he was still considering them in relation 
to their plays, and such ‘conclusions ’ as he arrived at concerned their place and import in 
the imagined worlds of the plays. They were still part of the ‘real work of analysis’, even 
though Burke might deny it. 
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With Bloom, we step into a stranger, more radical world. In marked contrast to formalist 
discipline of any kind, he wants to absorb the Shakespearean world into his own being 
(through ‘deep reading’), explore it thoroughly according to the dictates of his daemon, 
filter it through his capacious intelligence and quirky personality, and re-present it as a 
resource for the shaping, enlarging or ‘inventing’ of the human nature of his readers. By 
presenting and re-presenting his own Shakespearean agon, he invites his readers to 
‘overhear’ his struggles and ponderings as an aid to enlarging their sense of human 
nature, adding to their self-knowledge. He doesn’t despise scholarship as such, textual or 
otherwise, nor does he decline historical information; he merely relegates them to an 
earlier stage of the critical game, as something to be taken for granted.  Where Burke 
writes as an advocate of a new rigor in technical criticism, seeking to understand how 
meaning is made, Bloom, committed to taking meaning beyond itself into an exploration 
of significance, would echo Plato’s ghost and ask, “What then?”.57 Wherever Burke’s 
concern with art overflows its formal constraints, it does so in terms of massive 
sociological constructs, as when he writes that ‘Humanism, as I see it now, must square 
itself against a kind of Technologism that we confront today in capitalist, fascist, 
socialist, communist, tribalist, or anti-colonialist modes of expectation and exhortation’.58 
Presciently, he doubts whether such humanism has much of a chance. Bloom might well 
agree, and go on to argue that any failure of humanism should be laid at the door of 
critics’ failure to allow art to step into the realm of the real, to speak within human nature, 
so to speak, to ordinary people, the public. Unlike Jimmy Durante, he wants everyone to 
get into the act, because that is what art is for. The elitist Bloom can be surprisingly 
democratic. 
 
This is where the metaphysics come in. The ancient Greek word for character was 
‘ethos’, from which we derive our term ‘ethics’. Herakleitos (Fragment 119) told us that a 
person’s ethos is his daemon or fate,59 a proposition echoed in Bradley’s much-abused 
dictum that ‘In Shakespeare, character is destiny’.60 The phrase itself constitutes 
something of an historical cross-roads in debates between psychological or sociological 
and metaphysical or theological interpretations of character. Despite his Hegelian 
background, Bradley’s ‘character’ in Shakespearean Tragedy is predominantly a social 
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construct steered (uncertainly) by reason and disrupted by ‘flaws’ through which the 
irrational looms. Bloom’s is very different. Marinated in different strands of Orphism, 
Kabbalah and hermetism, Bloom’s characterology nevertheless adheres to a single 
dynamic, both in his criticism and in his own reading practice. Character, the empirical 
construct or social appearance, is only one pole, the mundane one, in the transaction 
between an individual and his or her daemon. It is interaction, or conversation, between 
the empirical self and its presiding daemon that informs a character and determines its 
destiny. The fates are indeed outside ourselves, weaving multiple possible destinies; but 
they invade us, take us over, smother us, only when we ignore the prompting, the 
intelligencing, of our daemon – and daemons, it should be noted, are far from uniformly 
moral! Bradley’s ‘character’ is a markedly bourgeois affair.  Bloom’s, by contrast, 
inspired by a different vein in pre-Socratic philosophy, and much influenced early on by 
E.R. Dodd’s seminal work, The Greeks and The Irrational (1951), 61 is character filtered 
through Emersonian transcendentalism. Indeed, Bloom would probably bracket Bradley 
with his comments on Freud, as here: 
Freud, like one strain in Pre-Socratic thought, is telling us that a person’s 
character is his fate. Emerson, like quite another strain in the Pre-Socratics, a 
shamanistic one, is telling us – as Yeats did – that the daemon is our destiny. Our 
longing for the wider circumference is daemonic, and belongs to personality as 
against character, to use an Emersonian dialectic which Yeats inherited from that 
brilliant rhetorician, his own father. The daemon knows how we do it or why it is 
done; we are along for the glory, and the sorrows, of the ride.62   
      
The term ‘transcendental’ in philosophy does not mean ‘transcendent’, a going beyond 
the limits imposed by the constitution of human sensibility. We are not contemplating 
supernatural worlds, remote architectures of Platonic form outside the human (this would, 
in any case, be a misapprehension of Plato). As defined by Kant, and adopted with 
idiosyncratic inflections by Coleridge, Carlyle and then Emerson, the transcendental is 
the inward liminal boundary of consciousness: not ‘consciousness of’, just consciousness. 
It is human knowing at the limit, or knowing minus empirical input of any kind, 
awareness of empirical selfhood included. 
 
The transcendental self is the locus of such knowing, and Romantic faith rests on what 
happens in this inner crucible. Nature originally carried an epigram from Plotinus, 
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plucked from Ralph Cudworth’s compilation of Platonic and Neoplatonic thought, The 
True Intellectual System of the Universe (1687): ‘Nature is but an image or imitation of 
wisdom, the last thing of the soul; nature being a thing which doth only do, but not 
know’.63 Humans have the capacity to know; it is their knowing which breathes 
significance into the world of nature, which ‘invents’ it and may by stages eventually 
arrive at ‘wisdom’, ‘the last thing of the soul’. The Romantics had enthusiastically 
embraced Kant’s discovery that the mind was not Lock’s tabula rasa passively awaiting 
the shaping impact of sensations, but a creative energy poured into the world through an 
informing matrix of categories intrinsic to the mind’s constitution; space, time, causality 
and number being fundamental. This action of the mind ‘invents’ the world we 
experience. Russell Goodman,64 building on suggestions by Stanley Cavell and David 
van Leer, has pointed out that Emerson’s wonderful essay ‘Experience’ could well be 
understood as his re-invention of the world through the lens of his own idiosyncratically 
selected Kantian-style categories: ‘Illusion, Temperament, Succession, Surface, Surprise, 
Reality, Subjectiveness’ – the famous ‘lords of life’.65 Whereas the original Kantian 
categories function unconsciously, as part of the constitution of the human mind, their 
Emersonian developments are to a degree governed intentionally. In a similar, secondary 
fashion, some of Bloom’s grand recapitulatory forays into his favoured terrains of world 
literature are organized and ‘visioned’ through shaping categories, part of his cultural 
rather than physiological epistemology, as a means of ordering and giving meaning to the 
world of letters: ‘belief’ (Ruin the Sacred Truths, 1989);66 ‘genius’ (Genius: A Mosaic of 
One Hundred Exemplary Creative Minds, 2002); ‘wisdom’ (Where Shall Wisdom Be 
Found?, 2004). His other books are all explorations of the ways in which poets and 
writers invent their worlds through agonistic struggle with their precursors. Will their 
genius, their daemon, prevail over the extant powers of artistic influence and authority? 
Or will the result be merely an Emersonian sepulchre hiding the distressed remains of a 
more powerful artistic ancestor, moreover one who is – disturbingly – forever capable of 
rising from the dead whenever he or she is read with passion and insight? These are 
Bloom’s questions. 
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But the biggest, the most encompassing Emersonian or ‘quasi-Kantian’ category for 
Bloom is ‘Shakespeare’, the phenomenon who constitutes, according to Emerson, ‘the 
horizon beyond which at present we do not see’.67 Bloom praises Johnson because ‘he is 
always sufficiently inside Shakespeare’s plays to judge them as he judges human life, 
without ever forgetting that Shakespeare’s function is to bring life to mind, to make us 
aware of what we could not find without Shakespeare’.68 The means of bringing ‘life to 
mind’ is Johnsonian ‘invention’, a word at this period poised between the heritage of 
Renaissance rhetoric (‘discovery’, and the sense of linguistic and conceptual fertility) and 
the dominant modern sense of bringing into being something utterly unprecedented. This 
‘invention’ is not some frantic excess of imaginative creativity, zestfully overlaying what 
we ordinarily experience as the real world with romantic insight or fancy: it is simply the 
way the mind works. Shakespeare’s world is the way his mind works. I’m thinking here 
of the opening words of Schopenhauer’s great book, ‘The world is my representation’.69 
The world is as we know it; or else, for us, not at all. Bloom the Gnostic prophet is not 
saying that Shakespeare took God’s place in creating ‘the human’; that would be fatuous. 
Nor is he merely saying that Shakespeare was better at representing human nature than 
other artists, though he would certainly agree with the statement. What Bloom is saying is 
that Shakespeare saw more of ‘the human’ than others have, saw in the Gnostic sense of 
‘knew’; therefore there was more for him to present to us.  It is not just that subsequent 
artists have inevitably been trapped in dominant Shakespearean modes of representation 
and character (though Bloom usefully explores the astonishing extent to which that is 
also true). It is that they haven’t ‘seen’ as much as he does and therefore they haven’t the 
imaginative power to do more than imitate, tweak, fragment or dilute the Shakespearean 
and subsequent legacies. They are quoting, in the Emersonian sense, when they think 
they are creating. That is the claim. When Johnson praises Shakespeare for his power of 
inventing characters, it is Shakespeare he is praising, not any pre-existing 
superabundance of characters waiting out there for him to imitate or represent. (We might 
think, here, of Whitman’s very Emersonian Song of Myself (1855): ‘Do I contradict 
myself? /Very well then, I contradict myself,/ (I am large, I contain multitudes.)’)70 The 
multitudes are there, but only Shakespeare saw them. He also had the skill to represent 
them, to ‘bring life to mind’. 
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 One of the difficulties in assessing Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human is that it 
comes late in the Bloomian oeuvre. Many references are gestural rather than fully 
substantiated, and you have to have followed Bloom through the 60s, 70s and 80s to 
understand in any depth what he is saying in the 90s. Nevertheless, there is no need for 
his commentators to be quite so thoroughly at sea. A few examples from Bloom’s 
Shakespeare must suffice. An appendix to Richard Levin’s contribution71 names some 26 
works, ranging from Georges Gusdorf’s La Découverte de Soi (1948)72 to Michael 
Mascuch’s Origins of the Individual Self (1996), 73 in which claims are made for the 
inception of particular human traits – the Human, the Individual, the Self, Consciousness, 
Identity, Interiority, Subjectivity – at different periods from Classical Greece to 
eighteenth-century England. The list is supposed to be what Humpty-Dumpty would call 
‘a nice, knock-down argument’, demolishing the contention captured in Bloom’s title, 
namely that Shakespeare somehow is ‘the invention of the human’. All it really shows, 
however, is that Levin doesn’t understand Bloom’s Emersonian, quasi-Kantian outlook at 
all. Christy Desmet is puzzled that Bloom should be scrupulous in seeing that his Chelsea 
House Modern Critical Interpretations series is properly documented, and yet so cavalier 
in matters of scholarly presentation in Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human.74 
Terence Hawkes is equally affronted: ‘Don’t expect footnotes - - - - Don’t expect a 
bibliography. Don’t expect an index. Don’t expect a single edition of the plays to 
underpin the quotations - - - - That it should come to this’.75 The rationale is rather 
simple. The Chelsea House series belongs to what Bloom calls ‘the scene of instruction’ 
– as Desmet duly notes – to the process of intellectual orientation and readerly 
assimilation, a first order activity subject to the mechanisms of scholarship (those same 
mechanisms so tellingly mocked by Emerson in ‘The American Scholar’). Shakespeare, 
in contrast, exhibits (Bloom’s) mind shaping and re-shaping itself in contest with 
Shakespeare’s, for the delectation of the public, relishing its free creativity by 
transforming meaning into significance. Another example: Gary Taylor really has no idea 
why Bloom disdains the New Oxford Shakespeare for perversely seeking ‘more often 
than not, to print the worst possible text, poetically speaking’.76 Taylor quotes Bloom as 
writing, ‘“The Oxford edition of Gary Taylor” is the “worst” of all Shakespeare editions.’ 
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77 The actual quotation from Bloom reads: ‘There is indeed a bad fashion among some 
Shakespearean scholars to reduce the poet-dramatist to the crudest texts that somehow 
can be deemed authentic; Sir Frank Kermode has protested eloquently against this 
destructive practice, which can be seen at its worst in the Oxford Edition of Gary 
Taylor’.78 (Not quite the same, is it?) Again, the rationale is simple. Away from the 
‘scene of instruction’ only the fully realized work of art counts, not the textual 
foundations – that is what Bloom means: his Shakespeare matters, not the corpse in the 
classroom or the editor’s study. 
 
And why is Bloom so appalled by the so-called ‘school of resentment’? There is space 
for only one example but it is, I hope, tellingly symptomatic. The famously over-wrought 
conclusion to Greenblatt’s Renaissance Self-fashioning (1980) reads as follows: 
 When I first conceived this book - - - [it] seemed to me the very 
hallmark of the Renaissance that middle-class and aristocratic males began 
to feel that they possessed such [autonomous] shaping power over their 
lives, and I saw this power and the freedom it implied as an important 
element in my sense of myself. But as my work progressed I perceived 
that fashioning oneself and being fashioned by cultural institutions – 
family, religion, state – were inseparably intertwined. In all my texts and 
documents, there were, so far as I could tell, no moments of pure 
unfettered subjectivity; indeed, the human subject itself began to seem 
remarkably unfree, the ideological product of the relations of power in a 
particular society. Whenever I focused sharply upon a moment of 
apparently autonomous self-fashioning, I found not an epiphany of an 
identity freely chosen, but a cultural artifact.79     
 
In other words, not a person but a thing: How bleak and scary! But surely this is exactly 
the nightmare predicament Emerson had warned America (and himself) about in the 
1830s? Greenblatt’s sombre invention of a moment when, under the unassimilated 
pressure of Foucault, the American dream, the tradition of his cultural forebears, 
collapsed for him is precisely the Romantic anxiety Emerson captured during the 
founding epoch of American letters, because he found himself in it, and then wrote about 
the process so precisely and at such length. How strange! Bloom will countenance no 
such desertions. 
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At one point Bloom calls Gnosticism ‘pragmatically the religion of literature’.80 He reads 
and writes in perpetual quest for fresh insight, and in flight from the dead world of facts 
and history. The great sin is to weld human nature fixedly to its informing heritage; 
particularly when Shakespeare has left the very best evidence there is of a human 
thinking freely with, round, and through his intellectual and cultural heritage, assessing it, 
challenging it, re-making it: behaving humanly. (Again, Nuttall’s A New Mimesis, 
particularly its conclusion, articulates this position elegantly and persuasively.) 81 
Bloom’s Gnosticism, then, isn’t a critical quirk but the basis of his transactions with the 
world. At the climax of a very strange book, Omens of Millennium (1997), he writes (and 
I leave this without comment for the reader’s consideration):  
 If you can accept a God who coexists with death camps, 
schizophrenia, and AIDS, yet remains all-powerful and somehow benign, 
then you have faith, and you have accepted the Covenant with Yahweh, or 
the Atonement of Christ, or the submission to Islam. If you know yourself 
as having an affinity with the alien, or stranger God, cut off from the 
world, then you are a Gnostic, and perhaps the best and strongest moments 
still come to what is best and oldest in you, to a breath or spark that long 
precedes Creation.82      
This is heady stuff, but at a more ordinary level – and here is the emphasis I need for this 
essay – the literary genius simply reads better than his or her fellows. In true Emersonian 
style, Nietzsche once proffered an extreme case where ‘a book speaks of nothing but 
events which lie outside the possibility of general or even rare experience – that it is the 
first language for a new range of experiences. In this case simply nothing will be heard, 
with the acoustical illusion that where nothing is heard there is nothing’.83 (The shades of 
a few unfortunate students linger in memory!) Shakespeare’s ‘boke’ offers the supreme 
challenge even for readers well-equipped for the ride. Instead of pursuing mechanically 
the implications of traditional interpretation, subduing any possibility of original thought 
to the lineaments of received wisdom, the genius is capable of what Bloom calls ‘strong 
reading’, reading which approaches and may even exceed the cognitive potential with 
which the text was originally endowed by its author. Better still, the genius will undertake 
strong mis-readings by absorbing the power of precursor literature into a vibrant stream 
of native intellection, thereby transforming it beyond anything its sober origins seemed to 
predict, let alone contain. (Compare Holinshead or North’s Plutarch or Greene’s 
Pandosto with what Shakespeare made of them, as I suspect many of us routinely ask our 
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students to do, and we get a good idea of what Bloom, riding on Emerson, actually means 
by strong reading.) 
 
Emerson writes in his essay on Shakespeare in Representative Men: 
 
Shakespeare is as much out of the category of eminent authors, as he is out 
of the crowd. He is inconceivably wise, the others conceivably. A good 
reader can in a sort nestle into Plato’s brain, and think from thence, but not 
into Shakespeare’s. We are still out of doors.84   
   
We mistake Emerson’s meaning if we take this as mere gush. That last phrase, ‘We are 
still out of doors’, says it all. We never feel comfortably inside Shakespeare’s mind, only 
partially so, because what that mind produced seems to exceed not only our own feeble 
capacities, but those of his fellow writers and the many that have followed. I’m not so 
much concerned with the notion of Shakespeare’s wisdom, which can readily be argued 
about, as with the suggestion that, if one is fair to them, it is more difficult to exhaust the 
fertile meanings of Shakespeare’s texts than of those of any other author. What Emerson 
and Bloom insist on is that once we have taken our scholarly and interpretive powers to 
their limit, expended all our intellectual and experiential resources, there is still in 
Shakespeare something unfathomable and beyond our apprehension. We can’t capture 
the radically free creativity of the transcendental self, Shakespeare’s self, that 
undetermined stream of inspiration which, exasperatingly from a materialist standpoint, 
hopefully from ours, simply eludes explanation.  
 
 * * * 
 
Someone not too different from us scratched some meaning (whatever it might be) on 
those two little ochre blocks in the Blombos cave 70 000 years ago. He or she had 
companions, family, perhaps friends and colleagues fitted to the circumstances, all much-
of-a-much-ness from a sociological perspective. Why did that particular someone, and 
not someone else, make the breakthrough? Our only answer must be – genius. That being 
(would we call him or her a ‘person’?), someone outwardly no more special or distinctive 
than anyone else, did something unprecedented, remarkable, ‘mind-blowing’; something 
for which any conceivable accolade would be inadequate. He or she had no doubt learned 
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much from others; there must have been precedents and precursors from whom useful 
notions and practices, however tangential or diminished, were gleaned. But this one 
individual (let us imagine), at that particular moment made, created, something utterly 
untoward, amazingly outside the cultural repertoire. 
 
This is the moment Emerson and Bloom celebrate. It is not the little blocks of ochre, or 
Shakespeare’s Collected Works themselves (perhaps in some un-postmodern Bloomian 
textual incarnation!) that matter – though they do indeed matter. Rather it is the evidence 
provided of humanity creating outside history and tradition, thinking and feeling the 
unprecedented, that excites their addictive admiration. Like all true Romantics, Emerson 
and Bloom yearn for the spark ‘that long precedes Creation’.85 Dinosaurs never shared 
the planet with humans. This may be why the Brontosaurus Bloom symbolically occludes 
himself from contemporary American Academia: he is afraid of those who have forgotten 
what it means to be human, and not merely a quotation. 
 
I don’t read Shakespeare the way Bloom does. There is an un-nuanced bluntness to some 
of his judgments which I find uncongenial.86 I see considerably more value in group 
mores, if not group morality, than he does. I believe literary study has an important social 
function; he doesn’t. His underestimation of the public and the political, or rather his 
shrinking from them, seems to me a deplorable impoverishment of literature. The teacher 
in me shudders at the effects automated bardolatry produces in those encountering 
Shakespeare for the first time, especially those providentially sceptical university 
undergraduates who appear annually in our classrooms. It’s no good telling people that 
Shakespeare is deeply fascinating. Generally speaking, one only finds out how good he is 
through differential comparison; that is, by reading a great many other authors carefully 
and reflectively – as Bloom himself has done in so gargantuan a fashion. Then we marvel 
at Shakespeare. For the record, I am also perfectly willing to expend intellectual energy 
on scholarship and on the exploration of sociological and historical circumstances. But 
when Harold Bloom writes of Shakespeare, ‘Who can dispute his good eminence, to 
which merit alone raised him?’, 87 I find myself wanting to cheer for that little word 
‘alone’. Sociological conditioning and historical process is shared; genius stands alone. 
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Years ago, I went through the records of the British Council in Portland Place, which in 
part comprise reports from cultural officers stationed abroad on theatrical tours sent to 
different parts of the world. Some time in the early 70s, someone had the bright idea that 
there was more to British theatre than Shakespeare. Why not try other playwrights? So 
they sent a tour to East Africa playing Ayckbourne and Pinter.88 A distressed report 
arrived some months later saying in effect, ‘Please send Shakespeare – the only people 
who can understand Ayckbourne and Pinter are expatriate colonials at the social clubs’. 
The horizons framed by Shakespeare’s ‘transparent eyeball’ evidently include parts other 
playwrights cannot reach. 
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